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Abstract
In a world with limited resources, allocation of resources to certain individuals and
conditions inevitably means fewer resources allocated to other individuals and
conditions. Should a patient's personal responsibility be relevant to decisions re-
garding allocation? In this project we combine the normative and the descriptive,
conducting an empirical bioethical examination of how both Norwegian and British
doctors think about principles of responsibility in allocating scarce healthcare re-
sources. A large proportion of doctors in both countries supported including re-
sponsibility for illness in prioritization decisions. This finding was more prominent in
zero‐sum scenarios where allocation to one patient means that another patient is
denied treatment. There was most support for incorporating prospective responsi-
bility (through patient contracts), and low support for integrating responsibility into
co‐payments (i.e. through requiring responsible patients to pay part of the costs of
treatment). Finally, some behaviours were considered more appropriate grounds for
deprioritization (smoking, alcohol, drug use)—potentially because of the certainty of
impact and direct link to ill health. In zero‐sum situations, prognosis also influenced
prioritization (but did not outweigh responsibility). Ethical implications are discussed.
We argue that the role that responsibility constructs appear to play in doctors'
decisions indicates a needs for more nuanced—and clear—policy. Such policy should
account for the distinctions we draw between responsibility‐sensitive and prog-
nostic justifications for deprioritization.
K E YWORD S
attitude of health personnel, decision making, health priorities/ethics, healthcare rationing/
ethics, Norway, UK
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In a context of limited resources, public health authorities and
medical health practitioners often have to make difficult decisions
about how to allocate funds, treatments, and very scarce resources,
such as organs. The current COVID‐19 pandemic has brought this
into sharp focus with decisions having to be made about how to
allocate ventilators to patients in respiratory failure.1 In an ideal world
with unlimited resources, everybody would have immediate access to
the best treatment available. We do not, however, live in such a
world. Allocation of resources to certain individuals and conditions
inevitably means fewer resources allocated to other individuals and
conditions. Correspondingly, a central task in bioethics has been to
systematically examine the kinds of principles that could be ethically
justifiable in choosing how to allocate such scarce resources.2
There is a vast amount of normative work in philosophy and
bioethics exploring the concept of responsibility3 and the kinds of
decisions and policies that could be ethically justifiable in allocating
scarce resources.4 A variety of different proposals have been dis-
cussed, including polices that are to some extent sensitive to patients'
moral responsibility for their ill heath, others that discriminate on the
basis of the behaviours patients have engaged in, or on the basis of
differential prognosis given lifestyle factors.5
Such proposals indeed rest on subtly different justifications,
some of which invoke moral responsibility and some of which are
adjacent but distinct. We distinguish between three responsibility‐
sensitive and one prognostic allocation policy:
1. Policies that explicitly deprioritized patients who are (retro-
spectively) morally responsible for their role in causing their ill
health would effectively penalize those patients in response to a
perceived lesser claim on resources.
2. A ‘solidarity’ policy, according to which healthcare resources are a
public good, could advocate ‘charging’ people to engage in un-
healthy behaviour by asking them to share healthcare costs
through co‐payment when such behaviour is statistically linked to
the state of ill health requiring treatment. Such a policy may be
neutral on individual patients' moral responsibility for those states
of ill health in particular cases.
3. Policies that introduced lifestyle contracts, according to which patients
sign up to forgo unhealthy behaviours could justify deprioritization in
cases of breach of such contracts. In such cases, a (prospective) re-
sponsibility to forgo the unhealthy behaviours is not met.
The above three policy types are ‘responsibility‐sensitive’ in some way.
4. Finally, policies that deprioritized patients on the basis of worse
prognosis might appear to be holding those patients responsible, but
no such claim need in fact be made in order to argue that resources
should be distributed to maximize health outcomes across the
population.
This final policy type is not responsibility‐sensitive, although it may
appear so in cases where the prognosis is poor as a result of health‐
affecting behaviour (such as smoking or over‐eating).
For all this normative work, however, there is comparatively little
systematic investigation of how frontline healthcare professionals do
descriptively think about responsibility in resource allocation cases.6
In this work we fill this gap, combining the normative and the
descriptive by conducting an empirical bioethical examination of how
both Norwegian and British doctors think about principles of re-
sponsibility in allocating scarce healthcare resources. First, we sought
to shed light on how medical professionals think about personal re-
sponsibility and (de)prioritization in healthcare, both in terms of more
abstract principles and judgements in specific, detailed medical di-
lemmas. Second, we sought to explore the degree to which such
judgements might be sensitive to the national context in which the
medical professionals work.
In achieving these aims, we take care not to presuppose a particular
account of responsibility. We assume only that the concept of (moral)
responsibility for an outcome (i.e. backwards looking responsibility) is a
1Savulescu, J., Vergano, M., Craxì, L., & Wilkinson, D. (2020). An ethical algorithm for ra-
tioning life sustaining treatment during the COVID‐19 pandemic. British Journal of Anaes-
thesia, 125(3), 253–258.
2For example, see: ibid; Savulescu, J. (2018). Golden opportunity, reasonable risk and per-
sonal responsibility for health. Journal of Medical Ethics, 44(1), 59–61.
3For example, see: Feinberg, J. (1970). Doing and deserving: Essays in the theory of respon-
sibility. Princeton University Press; Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and
control: A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge University Press; Smart, J. J. C. (1961).
Free will, praise and blame. Mind, 70, 291–306; Strawson, P. (1962). Freedom and resent-
ment. Proceedings of the British Academy, 48, 1–25; Watson, G. (1982). Free will. Oxford
University Press; Levy, N. (2011). Hard luck: How luck undermines free will and moral re-
sponsibility. Oxford University Press.
4For example, see: Anand, S., Fabienne P., & Amartya, S. (2004). Public health, ethics, and
equity. Oxford University Press; Gostin, L. O., & Powers, M. (2006). What does social justice
require for the public's health? Public health ethics and policy imperatives. Health Affairs,
25(4), 1053–1060; Persad, G., Wertheimer, A., & Emanuel, E. J. (2009). Principles for allo-
cation of scarce medical interventions. The Lancet, 373(9661), 423–431; Wilkinson, D.,
Petrou, S., & Savulescu, J. (2018). Expensive care? Resource‐based thresholds for potentially
inappropriate treatment in intensive care. Monash Bioethics Review, 35(1–4), 2–23; Harris, J.
(1987). QALYfying the value of life. Journal of Medical Ethics, 13(3), 117–123.
5See: Brown, R. C., & Savulescu, J. (2019). Responsibility in healthcare across time and
agents. Journal of Medical Ethics, 45(10), 636–644; Davies, B., & Savulescu, J. (2019).
Solidarity and responsibility in health care. Public Health Ethics, 12(2), 133–144; Pillutla, V.,
Maslen, H., & Savulescu, J. (2018). Rationing elective surgery for smokers and obese pa-
tients: Responsibility or prognosis? BMC Medical Ethics, 19(1), 28; Sharkey, K., & Gillam, L.
(2010). Should patients with self‐inflicted illness receive lower priority in access to health-
care resources? Mapping out the debate. Journal of Medical Ethics, 36(11), 661–665;
Savulescu, op. cit. note 2; Vallgårda, S., Nielsen, M. E. J., Hartlev, M., & Sandøe, P. (2015).
Backward‐ and forward‐looking responsibility for obesity: Policies from WHO, the EU and
England. European Journal of Public Health, 25(5), 845–848.
6Although see: Ayres, P. J. (1996). Rationing health care: Views from general practice. Social
Science & Medicine, 42(7), 1021–1025; Bringedal, B., & Feiring, E. (2011). On the relevance of
personal responsibility in priority setting: A cross‐sectional survey among Norwegian medical
doctors. Journal of Medical Ethics, 37, 357–361; Lauridsen, S. M., Norup, M., & Rossel, P.
(2008). Bedside rationing by general practitioners: A postal survey in the Danish public
healthcare system. BMC Health Services Research, 8(1),192; Perneger, T. V., Martin, D. P., &
Bovier, P. A. (2002). Physicians' attitudes toward health care rationing. Medical Decision
Making, 22(1), 65–70; Pinho, M., & Veiga, P. (2020). Attitudes of health professionals con-
cerning bedside rationing criteria: A survey from Portugal. Health Economics, Policy and Law,
15(1), 113–127; Rosén, P., & Karlberg, I. (2002). Opinions of Swedish citizens, health‐care
politicians, administrators and doctors on rationing and health‐care financing. Health
Expectations, 5(2), 148–155; Ryynänen, O. P., Myllykangas, M., Kinnunen, J., & Takala, J.
(1999). Attitudes to health care prioritization methods and criteria among nurses, doctors,
politicians and the general public. Social Science & Medicine, 49(11), 1529–1539; Strech, D.,
Persad, G., Marckmann, G., & Danis, M. (2009). Are physicians willing to ration health care?
Conflicting findings in a systematic review of survey research. Health Policy, 90(2–3), 113–124.
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function of knowledge and control.7 While, therefore, other scholars have
made philosophical distinctions between different species of moral re-
sponsibility (e.g. attributability, accountability, answerability8), we take a
broad view that can include the various types of backwards responsibility
as well as forward‐looking responsibility.9 In this way we take our lead
from work in experimental philosophy and experimental bioethics,10
adopting a more bottom‐up approach to explore how healthcare pro-
fessionals appear to actually think about responsibility and how they in-
corporate notions of personal responsibility in their beliefs about
deprioritization.
In the same way, we do not take a position on whether people should
be held responsible for certain acts when subject to potentially compul-
sive desires. The debate about whether people with addiction11 or mental
illness more generally12 are fully responsible for engaging in some harmful
acts, and whether this should be factored into (de)prioritization, remains a
live ethical issue subject to much debate. Given this, we do not take a
position in this paper. Rather, we descriptively explore what allocation
decisions doctors actually do make in these cases—for example do they
endorse diverting resources away from someone with addiction. We do
not seek to address whether they are normatively justified in making
these decisions. Healthcare professionals are unlikely to be as intimately
familiar with philosophical distinctions between types of responsibility as
philosophers are, and yet it is critical to understand how these people that
are on the front line think about these issues. Further, our task here is to
demonstrate that policymakers need to reach a position on the defensi-
bility of responsibility‐sensitive policies, especially if it is the case that
responsibility (or responsibility adjacent) factors are playing a role in the
decisions made by healthcare professionals.
1.1 | How do medical professionals think about
personal responsibility and (de)prioritization?
With an increasing focus on personal responsibility in health emerging in
public discourse, a small but growing body of work over the last decade
has considered how laypeople think about responsibility and allocation of
healthcare resources. In the Netherlands, for example, people tend to
disagree with the idea that those with unhealthy lifestyles should benefit
from the healthcare system without a financial arrangement,13 and in
Australia people give a low priority in allocating healthcare resources to
people perceived as ‘self‐harmers’ because of smoking, or heavy
drinking.14 In the United States, one survey showed that the majority of
participants believed that there should be higher health insurance pre-
miums for smokers.15 On the other hand, surveys of a general British
population have showed almost an equal split between those who agreed
and those who disagreed with idea that the NHS should pay the
healthcare costs related to risky behaviours, with wider consensus among
respondents in relation to smoking, heavy drinking, and sedentary lives,
than to overeating, or poor diets.16 Such studies have begun to provide
valuable insight into how ordinary people think about personal respon-
sibility and (de)prioritization, but there is much we still need to know.
Most importantly, we need to know how practicing healthcare pro-
fessionals think about these issues. Healthcare professionals—and espe-
cially doctors—are on the front line of diagnosis and treatment, and
therefore have significant impact on priorities in healthcare. Doctors
routinely face decisions about referring patients for treatments, or are
tasked with prioritizing attendance between multiple patients. Important
insight into this has already been provided by a few studies. For example,
as part of a broader survey on which areas of the healthcare system
needed more funding, and how this should be financed, Werntoft and
Edberg17 show that only a small minority of Swedish physicians (11%)
believed that ‘If patients have caused their disease themselves they
should pay for treatment’ (though a more recent focused survey of
Swedish physicians found that 83.9% of doctors believed that a hip re-
placement surgery should be made conditional upon giving up smoking,
suggesting that personal responsibility is being considered18). In previous
work one of us (BB) showed that most Norwegian doctors disagree with
the idea that healthcare priority should depend on the patient's respon-
sibility for the disease,19 with recent studies replicating this among
7For example: Fischer & Ravizza, op. cit. note 3.
8For example: Shoemaker, D. (2011). Attributability, answerability, and accountability:
Toward a wider theory of moral responsibility. Ethics, 121(3), 602–632.
9Vincent, N. A. (2011). A structured taxonomy of responsibility concepts. In N. A. Vincent, I.
van de Poel, & J. van den Hoven (Eds.), Moral responsibility: Beyond free will and determinism
(pp. 15–35). Springer, Springer Nature.
10Earp, B. D., Demaree‐Cotton, J., Dunn, M., Dranseika, V., Everett, J. A., Feltz, A., Geller, G.,
Hannikainen, I. R., Jansen, L. A., Knobe, J., Kolak, J., Latham, S., Lerner, A., May, J., Mercurio,
M., Mihailov, E., Rodríguez‐Arias, D., López, B. R., Savulescu, J., Sheehan, M., Strohminger, N.,
Sugarman, J., Tabb, K., & Tobia, K. (2020).
Experimental philosophical bioethics. AJOB Empirical Bioethics, 11(1), 30–33; Nichols, S.
(2006). Folk intuitions on free will. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6(1–2), 57–86; Nahmias,
E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005). Surveying freedom: Folk intuitions about
free will and moral responsibility. Philosophical Psychology, 18(5), 561–584; Malle, B. F., &
Knobe, J. (1997). The folk concept of intentionality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
33(2), 101–121.
11Foddy, B., & Savulescu, J. (2010). A liberal account of addiction. Philosophy, Psychiatry, &
Psychology: PPP, 17(1), 1–22; Levy, N. (2006). Autonomy and addiction. Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, 36(3), 427–447. https://doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2006.0018; Snoek, A. (2017). How
to recover from a brain disease: Is addiction a disease, or is there a disease‐like stage in
addiction? Neuroethics, 10(1), 185–194.
12Broome, M. R., Bortolotti, L., & Mameli, M. (2010). Moral responsibility and mental illness:
A case study. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 19, 179–187; King, M, & May, J.
(2018). Moral responsibility and mental illness: A call for nuance. Neuroethics, 11(1), 11–22.
13Bonnie, L. H., van den Akker, M., van Steenkiste, B., & Vos, R. (2010). Degree of solidarity
with lifestyle and old age among citizens in the Netherlands: Cross‐sectional results from the
longitudinal SMILE study. Journal of Medical Ethics, 36(12), 784–790.
14Anderson, M., Richardson, J., McKie, J., Iezzi, A., & Khan, M. (2011). The relevance of
personal characteristics in health care rationing: What the Australian public thinks and why.
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 70(1), 131–151.
15Berk, M. L., Gaylin, D. S., & Schur, C. L. (2006). Exploring the public's views on the health
care system: A national survey on the issues and options. Health Affairs, 25(6), w596–w606.
16Miraldo, M., Galizzi, M., Merla, A., Levaqqi, R., Schulz, P., Auxilia, F., Castaldi, S., & Gellati,
U. (2014). Should I pay for your risky behaviours? Evidence from London. Preventive
Medicine, 66, 145–158.
17Werntoft, E., & Edberg, A. K. (2009). Decision makers' experiences of prioritisation and
views about how to finance healthcare costs. Health Policy, 92(2–3), 259–267.
18Björk, J., Juth, N., & Lynøe, N. (2018). ‘Right to recommend, wrong to require’ – An
empirical and philosophical study of the views among physicians and the general public on
smoking cessation as a condition for surgery. BMC Medical Ethics, 19(1), 2.
19Bringedal & Feiring, op. cit. note 6.
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Portuguese physicians.20 Interestingly, in line with the findings of Miraldo
et al.21 on laypeople, both Norwegian and Portuguese physicians were
more likely to agree with deprioritization based on a patient's smoking or
heavy drinking than they were based on a patient's diet or fitness.22
In this study we wanted to investigate how medical professionals
think about personal responsibility and (de)prioritization in healthcare
by supplementing previously‐developed questions23 with new
questions that we designed to probe the phenomenon further. The
existing studies have given insight into how doctors respond to
general statements about responsibility (e.g. do they agree or dis-
agree that ‘Healthcare priority should depend on the patient's per-
sonal responsibility for the disease’), and which factors doctors think
should be taken into account for (de)prioritization (e.g. excessive al-
cohol consumption, obesity, smoking).
In our work we wanted to replicate this in a British sample while
also including new measures that allowed us to gain a deeper un-
derstanding. For example, it remains unclear based on the existing
work how much doctors' responses are based on perceptions of
personal responsibility rather than prognosis. Bioethical debate
has highlighted tension between personal responsibility and prog-
nosis as justifications for treatment allocation,24 and some of the
measures were designed to help clarify this. We examined doctors'
responses to detailed vignettes describing patients varying in both
personal responsibility and prognosis, and asking which patient
should be treated.
1.2 | Are there differences between countries with
different regulations in how medical professionals
think about personal responsibility and (de)
prioritization?
Different distributive principles and frameworks are employed in different
systems. In the United Kingdom, two overarching principles are
employed: first, ‘equal opportunity of treatment for those in equal need’,
and, second, a (broadly) utilitarian principle that directs spending and
allocation to maximize the health benefits accrued across the population
from that spending.25 These principles might be thought to be somewhat
in tension,26 but together potentially preclude differential treatment of
patients on any grounds other than therapeutic effectiveness.
As a solidarity‐oriented welfare state, the situation in Norway is not
dissimilar to that of the United Kingdom. Within specialized healthcare,
priorities in Norway are legally required to be based on the following
three criteria: (a) severity of the disease, (b) benefit of treatment, and (c)
cost‐effectiveness of the intervention.27 However, there are a couple of
differences between the operation of the Norwegian system compared
to the United Kingdom. For example, cost‐sharing, or ‘co‐payment’ is to
some extent more prominent in Norway than the United Kingdom: In
Norway, patients pay between €15 and 35 per GP consultation and out‐
patient visit, up to a ceiling of €240 per year. Through these charges, the
Norwegian Ministry of Health aimed to curb demand from people with
minor healthcare problems, reduce the growth in public spending and free
up resources for high‐priority areas.28 However, to date, such cost‐
sharing in Norway has not explicitly differentiated between patients on
the basis of factors such as responsibility. No such charges exist for these
particular NHS services in the United Kingdom (but in both the United
Kingdom and Norway patients co‐pay for prescription medication and
dental care).
The respective official positions on the (ir)relevance of a patient's
personal responsibility to their claim to resources differ to some extent
between the United Kingdom and Norway. In Norway, whether re-
sponsibility should be taken into account in prioritization has been ex-
plicitly considered—and rejected—by two governmental committees (in
1997 and 2014). Indeed, while Norwegian legislation explicitly defines the
criteria upon which priorities should be made, patient responsibility is not
among them. In the United Kingdom, although no official statement has
been made to explicitly permit deprioritization on the basis of personal
responsibility, one's personal responsibility for one's health has been
highlighted in official statements. For example:
The NHS belongs to all of us. There are things that we
can all do for ourselves and for one another to help it
work effectively, and to ensure resources are used
responsibly… [including recognising] that you can
make a significant contribution to your own, and your
family's, good health and well‐being, and take personal
responsibility for it’ (The NHS Constitution, 201529).
Further, there are practices and policies in the United Kingdom
that might appear to give at least some weight to personal respon-
sibility. For example, in particular contexts, patients are asked to sign
a contract agreeing to make changes to their lifestyle—for example to
practice healthier nutrition or stop smoking.30 Indeed, a 2016 report
from the UK‐based Royal College of Surgeons found that over one in
three Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) in England were denying
20Pinho, M., & Borges A. P. (2019). The views of health care professionals and laypersons
concerning the relevance of health‐related behaviors in prioritizing patients. Health
Education & Behavior, 46(5),728–736.
21Miraldo et al., op. cit. note 16.
22Bringedal & Feiring, op. cit. note 6; Pinho & Borges, op. cit. note 20.
23Ibid.
24For example see Pillutla et al., op. cit. note 5.
25Cost‐effectiveness of an intervention or treatment is determined by calculating how many
quality‐adjusted life years (QALYs) it is expected to accrue for a given amount of spending. A
QALY is a measure used to express the value of health states in order to compare the
benefits of treatment. It is the arithmetic product of life expectancy and the quality of the
remaining years. One QALY is equal to 1 year of life in perfect health, and QALYs are
calculated by estimating the years of life remaining for a patient following a particular
treatment or intervention and weighting each year with a quality‐of‐life score (on a 0–1
scale).
26Harris, J. (2005). It's not NICE to discriminate. Journal of Medical Ethics, 31(7), 373–375.
27Note that in the most up‐to‐date Norwegian legislation the severity criterion has been
removed, though it was in place at the time of the surveys.
28For example, see: The Health Systems and Policy Monitor. (2021, January 13). Health




30For a discussion see Pillutla et al., op. cit. note 5.
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or delaying routine surgery to patients—such as hip and knee
replacements—until they stop smoking or lose weight, in contra-
vention of national clinical guidance.31 Such policies have rapidly
made their way into public consciousness, sparking intense public
debate about the fairness of such policies, and whether they are a
necessary and justifiable policy or instead just a punitive measure to
punish individuals for making ‘bad’ lifestyle choices.32
Importantly, however, official guidance from the NHS Commis-
sioning Board33—like in Norway—explicitly forbids prioritizing based
on personal responsibility, stating that ‘Individual patients or groups
should not be unjustifiably advantaged or disadvantaged on the basis
of [many things, including] lifestyle’.
In summary, we therefore note the following differences and
similarities:
1. Both systems adopt a primary guiding principle of ensuring suf-
ficient cost‐effectiveness in healthcare.
2. The relevance of personal responsibility for healthcare resource
allocation has been explicitly considered and rejected in Norway
but not in the United Kingdom.
3. There are more instances of (responsibility‐insensitive) cost‐
sharing in Norway than in the United Kingdom.
4. Patients in the United Kingdom but not in Norway are sometimes, but
not always, declined surgery unless they stop smoking or lose weight.
1.3 | Aims of this paper
We sought to understand how medical professionals in Norway and
the United Kingdom think about personal responsibility and (de)
prioritization in healthcare. Given the national healthcare systems'
similarities and differences, we aimed to compare the views of doc-
tors in Norway and the United Kingdom regarding various ways in
which personal responsibility could affect prioritization.
We present and discuss results from surveys of practitioners in
both countries to assess differences of opinions, and whether these
are in or out of line with official directives and practices. Our survey
and discussion also enable us to tease apart different ways in which
responsibility might be taken into account, and which of these, if any,
are favoured by practitioners.
We hypothesized that practitioners in Norway would be less in
favour of responsibility‐sensitive allocation in general.
2 | METHOD
2.1 | Participants
For the British data, participants were recruited via Wilmington
Healthcare in December 2018. Qualified medical professionals in the
United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland)
who were part of a large survey mailing list (n = 8,500) were invited to
participate, and participants completed the survey online. Four
hundred and ninety‐nine participants (response rate: 6%) consented
to take part, and for the purposes of analyses we included only
participants who answered at least 50% of the questions. After ex-
cluding 71 participants, we were left with a final sample of 428
British medical professionals, including both general practitioners
(27% of the overall sample) and hospital specialists (73%). The ma-
jority of our sample were female (61.2%) and aged between 45 and
64 (81%).
For the Norwegian data, participants belong to a re-
presentative panel of 1,500–2,000 doctors, established in 1994
and surveyed biannually. In 2014–2015 the panel consisted of
1,545 doctors, working in all health services. The participants
completed the survey as a postal questionnaire. One thousand
one hundred and fifty‐eight of the 1,545 invited responded,
leaving a response rate of 75%. As for the UK data, for the pur-
poses of analyses we used a cut‐off criterion of requiring parti-
cipants to answer at least 50% of the questions to be included in
the analysis. This left a final sample of 1,141 participants, with
the majority being male (57.6%) and between 45 and 64 (50.2%).
Further details on the collection of the Norwegian data can be
seen in Bringedal et al.34
2.2 | Measures
2.2.1 | General responsibility statements
The first set of questions were five general statements concerning
the extent to which participants agreed that personal responsibility
should be taken into account for healthcare. Participants indicated
their response with five options: 1 = disagree completely, 2 = disagree,
3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 = agree strongly.
2.2.2 | Conditions for allocation
The second set of questions looked at which specific factors parti-
cipants thought should imply de‐prioritization. Participants were gi-
ven a list of nine risk‐factors: (a) overweight/obesity, (b) smoking, (c)
excessive alcohol consumption, (d) drug abuse, (e) lack of physical
31Royal College of Surgeons of England. (2016, April 22). More than one in three areas of
England restrict surgery for smokers and overweight patients [Press release]. https://www.
rcseng.ac.uk/news-and-events/media-centre/press-releases/more-than-one-in-three-areas-
of-england-restrict-surgery-for-smokers-and-overweight-patients/
32For example: Donnelly, L. (2018, March 18). Refusing surgery to obese people and smokers
is ‘discriminatory and cruel’, surgeons say. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
2018/03/02/refusing-surgery-obese-people-smokers-discriminatory-cruel-surgeons/;
Rawlinson, K., & Johnston, C. (2016, September 3). Decision to deny surgery to obese patients
is like ‘racial discrimination’. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/
03/hospitals-to-cut-costs-by-denying-surgery-to-smokers-and-the-obese
33NHS Commissioning Board. (2013). Commissioning policy: Ethical framework for priority
setting and resource allocation. https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/
cp-01.pdf
34Bringedal, B., Fretheim, A., Nilsen, S., & Rø, K. I. (2019). Do you recommend cancer
screening to your patients? A cross‐sectional study of Norwegian doctors. BMJ Open, 9(8),
e029739.
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exercise, (f) high risk sports leading to injury or disease, (g) poor
quality nutrition, (h) combination of the factors, and (i) violation of
contract of changed lifestyle. For each factor, participants indicated
either ‘Yes’ the factor should result in de‐prioritization, ‘No’ it should
not, or that they did not know.
2.2.3 | Vignettes
Third, we gave participants a set of three vignettes, taken from an existing
Norwegian project used in previous research35 and translated into
English. Each contained brief descriptions of a hypothetical clinical sce-
nario in which there are limited resources and only one of two patients
can be helped (see Table 1). These vignettes were chosen for two key
reasons: first, they have already been used in Norwegian samples over
the last decade; and second, by using three scenarios we could begin to
tease apart the potential justifications, which might draw on either
perceptions of responsibility or perceived prognosis (or both). For a longer
discussion of the relevant ethical features, see Section 4.1.3 and Table 5.
3 | EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
To analyse the data, we conducted a series of regression models
(linear regression for the questions scored on a scale; multinomial
regression for the questions with categorical response options), en-
tering in country as a predictor and controlling for participant age and
gender.
3.1 | Comparative results (United Kingdom and
Norway)
3.1.1 | General responsibility statements
Doctors in Norway and the United Kingdom had similar views on
whether healthcare priority should depend on the patient's personal
TABLE 1 Vignette text
Vignette 1 ‘You are the treating doctor of two patients. Patient A is long standing alcoholic who has given up drinking and has been sober for the
last year. He has end stage alcoholic cirrhosis. Patient B has primary biliary cirrhosis with end stage cirrhosis. Both have had life
threatening events in the last months and both are in their forties with no children and are single. They have both been waiting for a
transplant for an equal amount of time. A liver has become available that is an ABO match for either patient. Which patient should
receive the transplant?’
Vignette 2 ‘You are in a remote location called to two emergencies. You can only attend one immediately and 2 ambulances are on their way but
will take 20 mins to arrive to the patients. Patient B was helping her husband saw wood and her hand was caught in the electric saw
—her hand has been severed and she is bleeding heavily, possibly fatally. Patient A is a long‐standing patient in the clinic. She has a
history of recurrent self‐harm. You receive a call from her husband. Patient A has slashed her wrists and is bleeding heavily, perhaps
fatally. Which patient should you attend to?’
Vignette 3 ‘Patient A is a life‐long smoker. He grew up on a farm and all his family smoked. He has end stage emphysema and requires a lung
transplant to survive. He is currently smoking. He is 45 and in otherwise good health. Patient B is a non‐smoker, but has end stage
emphysema from alpha 1 antitrypsin deficiency. He is 40 but in poor health and had coronary artery bypass grafts last year. You can
refer only one patient for lung transplantation next week. Who do you refer?’
TABLE 2 General responsibility questions
Disagree (%) Neutral (%) Agree (%)
1. ‘Healthcare priority should depend on the patient's personal responsibility for the
disease’
United Kingdom 36.68 21.73 40.19
Norway 38.48 24.71 36.72
2. ‘Access to expensive treatment should depend on the patient's personal responsibility
for the disease’
United Kingdom 39.49 20.33 39.25
Norway 34.60 22.68 42.63
3. ‘Access to scarce organ transplants should depend on the patient's personal
responsibility for the disease’
United Kingdom 33.64 21.50 44.39
Norway 27.27 20.39 52.07
4. ‘Lower priority should be allotted to patients who violate a contract of changes in
lifestyle’
United Kingdom 19.39 18.46 61.45
Norway 24.54 28.68 46.51
5. ‘A patient who is responsible for the disease should pay additional co‐payments’ United Kingdom 57.94 21.73 20.09
Norway 67.43 22.77 9.27
35Bringedal & Feiring, op. cit. note 6; ibid.
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responsibility for the disease (see Table 2), with no significant dif-
ference in agreement between the two countries, p = .62. Forty per
cent of British doctors and 37% of Norwegian doctors agreed that
healthcare priority should depend on the patient's personal respon-
sibility for the disease, while 37% of British and 38% of Norwegian
doctors disagreed (see Figure 1).
Agreement was also comparable across countries on whether
access to expensive treatment should depend on the patient's per-
sonal responsibility for the disease, p = .066. Thirty‐nine per cent of
British doctors and 43% of Norwegian doctors agreed, while 39% of
British and 35% of Norwegian doctors disagreed.
There was a non‐significant but trend‐level difference between
the British and Norwegian doctors in their views on responsibility and
organ transplantation, p = .05, with 52% of Norwegian doctors
compared with 44% of British doctors agreeing that access to scarce
organ transplants should depend on the patient's personal responsi-
bility for the disease (see Figure 2).
British doctors were more likely than Norwegian doctors to
agree that lower priority should be allotted to patients who vio-
late a lifestyle change contract (61% vs. 47%), p < .0001, while
doctors in Norway were more likely to be neutral (29%) than UK
doctors (18%).
British doctors were slightly more likely than Norwegian
doctors to agree that patients who are responsible for their
disease should pay additional co‐payments (20% vs. 9%),
p < .0001. In both countries, however, the majority
disagreed: 58% in the United Kingdom, and 67% in Norway (see
Figure 3).
3.1.2 | Conditions for allocation
Next, we looked at which factors should lead to a lower priority for
patients' treatment where present.
TABLE 3 Vignette responses
Patient A Patient B Toss a coin Do not know
Norway United Kingdom Norway United Kingdom Norway United Kingdom Norway United Kingdom
Vignette 1 (%) 1.41 4.21 50.49 36.68 22.24 26.87 24.54 32.01
Vignette 2 (%) 1.59 2.80 71.67 66.12 8.38 13.79 18.36 17.06
Vignette 3(%) 19.68 25.23 47.40 54.44 6.18 4.67 26.21 15.42
F IGURE 1 Support for taking into account
patients’ personal responsibility into healthcare
priority
F IGURE 2 Support for taking into account
patients' personal responsibility for their illness
when deciding access to organ transplants
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A majority of doctors in both the United Kingdom and Norway
endorsed the idea that smoking, drug abuse, and excessive alcohol
should be taken into account for deprioritization of resource alloca-
tion. In contrast, a majority of doctors in both the United Kingdom
and Norway rejected taking into account lack of physical exercise,
participation in high risk sports, and poor quality nutrition (Figure 4).
Next, we looked at whether there were differences in responses
(yes vs. no vs. don't know) as a function of country, controlling for the
influence of age and gender. We found significant differences between
countries for weight, χ²(2) = 22.54, p < .001, smoking, χ²(2) = 7.11,
p = .029, drug use, χ²(2) = 9.13, p = .01, lack of exercise, χ²(2) = 9.75,
p = .007, violation of contract of changed lifestyle, χ²(2) = 75.90,
p < 0.001, involvement of high risk sports, χ²(2) = 53.03, p < .001, and
poor‐quality nutrition, χ²(2) = 29.13, p < .001. There was no difference in
responses as a function of country for alcohol, χ²(2) = 3.99, p = .14, and a
combination of factors, χ²(2) = 5.68, p = .059.
Looking at those factors for which there was a significant dif-
ference in overall responses by country, we focused in on the most
important comparison: those doctors in each country who endorsed
taking the factor into account compared to those who rejected taking
it into account. We found that British doctors were more likely than
Norwegian doctors to say that weight (p < .001), change of lifestyle
contract (p < .001), and lack of exercise, (p = .012), should be taken
into account than it should not.
In contrast, Norwegian doctors were more likely than British
doctors to say that poor quality nutrition (p < .001), and high risk
sports (p < .001), should be taken into account.
There was no difference between Norwegian and British doctors
in how much they endorsed versus rejected taking into account
smoking, with the overall difference being driven by Norwegian
doctors being more likely to say they did not know (p = .03).
3.1.3 | Vignettes
Our first vignette asked participants about liver transplantation to a pa-
tient with primary biliary cirrhosis (‘Patient B’) or one with alcoholic liver
disease (‘Patient A’: see Table 1 for full text, and Table 3 for responses).
We found that participants were more likely to indicate that the patient
with primary biliary cirrhosis—the relatively less personally responsible
one—should receive the liver transplant. We found that Norwegian
doctors were especially likely to choose the less personally responsible
patient over the patient with alcoholic liver disease (50% vs. 1%), com-
pared to British doctors (37% vs. 4%) (p < .001).
F IGURE 3 Support for having patients who
are responsible for their disease pay additional
co‐payments
(a) (b)
F IGURE 4 (a) Factors to be taken into account for allocation of healthcare (UK). (b) Factors to be taken into account for allocation of
healthcare (Norway)
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Our second vignette dealt with a case of emergency injury, and
whether to attend to a patient involved in a chainsaw accident (‘Patient
B’) or one who has self‐harmed (‘Patient A’). In both Norway (72%) and
the United Kingdom (66%) the majority of participants indicated that
they should attend to Patient B—the relatively less personally re-
sponsible patient, and there was no significant difference between the
two countries in the proportion choosing Patient B over Patient A.
Our third vignette dealt with a case of emphysema, and whether
to recommend for a lung transplantation a patient who was a life‐long
smoker but in good health (‘Patient A’), or a patient who is a non‐
smoker but in poor health (‘Patient B’). Overall, in both countries the
majority of participants indicated that they should attend to Patient B
—the relatively less personally responsible patient (though the dif-
ference was not as great as in the previous two vignettes).
3.2 | UK‐specific results
3.2.1 | Locus of responsibility
The vast majority of our participants felt that participants had a re-
sponsibility to both themselves (90.89%) and their families (82.71%),
and more than two‐thirds thought that people have a responsibility
to society to look after their health (69.16%).
3.2.2 | Support for elective procedures
After looking at descriptive statistics for all the items (see Table 4), we
used paired‐sample t‐tests to look at differences between the key pairs
of items. For both obese, t(416) = −17.28, p < .001, d = −0.083, and
patients who smoke, t(421) = −17.76, p < .001, d = −0.084, doctors were
significantly more likely to agree with encouraging patients to complete a
period of changed lifestyle in which they stopped smoking/lost weight
before they received elective procedures, than they were to agree that
such elective procedures should simply be withheld until the patient has
stopped smoking/lost weight. The same pattern was observed for obese
women receiving IVF, t(416) = −15.91, p < .001, d = −0.067.
There was a significant difference between obesity and smoking
in the extent to which doctors endorsed both withholding treatment,
t(418) = 3.76, p < .001, d = 0.14, and encouraging lifestyle changes,
t(418) = 1.62, p < .001, d = 0.06, with doctors agreeing more for
obese patients than they did patients who smoke.
3.3 | Causes of unhealthy behaviour
Looking at participants' perceptions of the causes of unhealthy be-
haviour, our participants felt that nurture (i.e. environment and social
learning: 40.16%) had the strongest influence on people's engage-
ment in unhealthy behaviours, followed by free choice (i.e. personal
decisions: 34.28%), with nature (i.e. biology and genetics: 26.58%)
seen as the least impactful.
3.4 | Allocation of scarce resources
In a dilemma about which child to recommend for an organ transplant
—one child with Down syndrome, one without any underlying genetic
condition‐, we found that most participants (73.13%) felt that
whichever child was placed on the waiting list first should receive the
heart, regardless of whether the child had Down syndrome or no
underlying condition. A much smaller minority thought that the child
with Down syndrome should have some, but a lower, chance of re-
ceiving the heart (16.12%), and very few participants felt that the
child with Down syndrome should not receive the heart (6.07%).
3.5 | Oxford Utilitarianism Scale
Finally, we looked at responses on the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale
(OUS)36 and their relation to support for taking personal
TABLE 4 Support for restricting elective procedures for patients who are obese or smoking
Disagree (%) Neutral (%) Agree (%)
Obesity
‘Elective surgical procedures should be withheld from obese patients until they have lost weight’ 30.14 25.47 42.99
‘IVF should be withheld from obese patients until they have lost weight’ 25.47 28.83 48.60
‘Obese patients should be encouraged to lose weight before they receive an elective procedure’ 9.11 7.71 82.01
‘Obese patients should be encouraged to lose weight before they receive IVF’ 8.64 9.58 81.31
Smoking
‘Elective procedures should be withheld from patients who smoke until they quit smoking’ 37.85 21.26 39.95
‘Patients who smoke should be encouraged to quit smoking before they receive an elective procedure’ 12.15 8.41 78.27
36Kahane, G., Everett, J. A., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu,
J. (2018). Beyond sacrificial harm: A two‐dimensional model of utilitarian psychology.
Psychological Review, 125(2), 131.
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responsibility into account for prioritization. The OUS consists of two
sub‐scales that dissociate individual differences in the ‘negative’
(permissive attitude toward instrumental harm) and ‘positive’ (im-
partial concern for the greater good, or impartial beneficence) di-
mensions of utilitarian thinking as manifested in the general
population.
Looking first at the correlation of the OUS sub‐scales with the
general responsibility statements, we found that endorsement of
instrumental harm positively predicted taking personal responsibility
into account across every item (all ps < .001). People who endorsed
causing harm in order to bring about the greater good, that is, were
more likely to agree that access to expensive treatment, and organ
transplants should depend on the patient's personal responsibility,
and that patients who are responsible for a disease should pay ad-
ditional co‐payments. In contrast, impartial beneficence was only
significantly correlated with one item, such that people who were
more likely to endorse the impartial maximization of the greater good
even at significant self‐sacrifice were more likely to think that pa-
tients who are responsible should pay additional co‐payments.
Next, we looked at the correlation of the OUS sub‐scales with
the questions on elective procedures. Again, endorsement of in-
strumental harm positively predicted taking personal responsibility
into account for elective procedures across every item (all ps < .05).
Impartial beneficence was not significantly correlated with any item.
4 | DISCUSSION
For the empirical component of this paper, we sought to understand
how medical professionals in both Norway and the United Kingdom
think about personal responsibility and (de)prioritization in health-
care. We compare the views of healthcare practitioners in Norway
and the United Kingdom regarding various ways in which personal
responsibility could affect prioritization.
Overall, in both countries, participants were fairly evenly split
between agreeing and disagreeing that healthcare priority should
depend on the patient's personal responsibility for the disease. In
both countries, participants were more likely to agree that access to
scarce organ transplants should depend on their personal responsi-
bility for the disease, and in both countries, participants were more
likely to disagree that a patient who is responsible for a disease
should pay additional co‐payments. In both countries a majority of
Norwegian and British doctors favoured deprioritization based on
smoking, excessive alcohol and drug abuse, but a majority were op-
posed to using lack of physical exercise, high risk sports or poor
nutrition. And in all three forced choice vignettes, for both countries,
the largest proportion of doctors favoured giving treatment to a
patient perceived not to be responsible for their illness. This was
most prominent for a patient with injury due to self harm, with more
than two‐thirds of respondents electing to prioritize a patient with
accidental (rather than self‐inflicted) injury.
There were, however, some interesting differences. For example,
Norwegian doctors were slightly more likely to agree that personal
responsibility should influence organ allocation, while British doctors
were more likely to support factoring responsibility into co‐
payments. Similarly, a higher proportion of British doctors were in
favour of making decisions sensitive to obesity or violation of a
contract, while a higher proportion of Norwegian doctors supported
deprioritization based on high risk sports or poor quality nutrition.
Our results are broadly consistent with previous work, both re-
plicating and extending previous surveys looking at laypeople and
physicians in different countries. Looking at the general responsibility
statements, we found that 37% of British doctors and 38% of Nor-
wegian doctors disagreed that ‘Healthcare priority should depend on
the patient's personal responsibility for the disease’—a comparable
proportion to the 34% found in Portuguese physicians37 when given
the same question.
Both our United Kingdom and Norwegian sample were more
likely to think that substance abuse and smoking should be taken into
account in (de)prioritization than should be a lack of exercise and
poor nutrition, mirroring previous findings in Norwegian physicians,38
Portuguese physicians,39 and both the British40 and Australian41
public. As for the responsibility statements, however, we found that
Norwegian doctors appeared more willing to take personal respon-
sibility into account in 2019 than they did in 2010: while 44%
thought smoking should be taken into account in 2010, this increased
to 60% in 2019; and while 38% thought alcohol abuse should be
taken into account in 2010, this increased to 57% in 2019.
4.1 | Ethical analysis
As noted in the Introduction, in this project we took an explicitly
bottom‐up approach to understand how healthcare professionals
think about responsibility and (de)prioritization in healthcare. We do
not adopt a specific normative account, and there are number of
potential justifications for responsibility‐sensitive allocation policies
in healthcare. Our survey data captured doctors' attitudes regarding
the relevance of patients' responsibility for resource allocation, but
also allowed us to hypothesize and potentially distinguish between
some of the justifications that could underlie their responses. It is
highly unlikely that any of our respondents had such complex phi-
losophical distinctions in mind, but we can draw some conclusions
from our data that are relevant for ethical analysis.
Broadly, responsibility‐sensitive policies could be justified on four
different grounds: retrospective responsibility penalty, solidarity/cost‐
internalization, breach of contract, and prognosis.42 Before presenting a
more focused ethical analysis from our data, we first briefly explain how
37Pinho & Borges, op. cit. note 20.
38Bringedal & Feiring, op. cit. note 6.
39Pinho & Borges, op. cit. note 20.
40Miraldo et al., op. cit. note 16.
41Anderson et al., op. cit. note 14.
42Brown & Savulescu, op. cit. note 5; Davies & Savulescu, op. cit. note 5; Pillutla et al., op. cit.
note 5; Sharkey & Gillam, op. cit. note 5; Savulescu, op. cit. note 2; Vallgårda et al., op. cit.
note 5.
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each of these grounds might justify differential allocation of resources,
before discussing the results of our survey in light of these.
Retrospective responsibility penalty: First, resource allocation
might be thought to be justified on the grounds that the patient is
morally responsible for their state of ill health, and therefore is less
deserving of resources. The most robust version of this position
would view patients as having failed in their moral responsibility to
maintain their health, and therefore justify penalizing them both as a
matter of desert and as a deterrent to others who might similarly fail
in their moral responsibility to maintain their health (for discussion
[and rejection] of this position43). This potential justification is ret-
rospective in the sense that it holds patients responsible and pena-
lizes them in response to their past behaviour. Such a justification
would require that patients had sufficient control and knowledge to
be morally responsible for their ill health. It could justify a wide range
of policies that consistently prioritized patients who required treat-
ment as a result of bad luck, regardless of their prognosis. Some have
argued that this potential justification erroneously assumes that
people have greater control over their behaviours than they actually
do—such that in many instances it is not the case that patients are
morally responsible for their ill health—and has been criticized for
being overly moralizing even in cases where people do have sufficient
control.44 In our survey, general statements one, two and three
—‘Healthcare priority should depend on the patient's personal re-
sponsibility for the disease’, ‘Access to expensive treatment should
depend on the patient's personal responsibility for the disease’, ‘Ac-
cess to scarce organ transplants should depend on the patient's
personal responsibility for the disease’—tap in to this sort of justifi-
cation for (de)prioritization. Further, agreement with any of the
statements regarding a locus of responsibility—whether to one's self,
family, or society—implies perception of a moral duty to maintain
good health. Attitudes towards whether failure in any of these per-
ceived duties should bear on prioritization, however, can only be
inferred from the general statements.
Solidarity/cost‐internalization: A second potential justification
would hold that it is fair to require individuals to internalize the costs
of their health‐affecting behaviour. Such a justification does not have
to take a position on moral responsibility in individual cases, but
instead posits that a solidarity‐based system, in which healthcare
resources are a public good, is appropriately supported by ‘charging’
people to engage in unhealthy behaviour (such as through taxes on
alcohol or cigarettes) or by asking them to share the costs of these
behaviours when they lead to a claim on healthcare resources. Such a
justification would still present some difficulty when it came to as-
sessing who should share costs and who should not (i.e. difficulty
establishing a causal connection between behaviour and illness), but
would justify practices of cost‐sharing and co‐payment for certain
behaviour‐disease combinations. This justification would not, for
example, straightforwardly justify prioritization in the case of organ
transplants, as it determines circumstances in which an individual has
to contribute extra resources to the pool, rather than identifying any
circumstances in which resources can be withheld. However, those
who require organs as a likely result of engaging in unhealthy be-
haviour could be required to contribute financially, regardless of
whether they are also deprioritized. General statement five—‘A pa-
tient who is responsible for the disease should pay additional co‐
payments’—taps into this justification for differential practices.
Breach of contract: The third potential justification for
responsibility‐sensitive allocation holds that, when an individual has
committed to making feasible changes to their lifestyle to improve or
maintain their health, they acquire a prospective responsibility to
honour that commitment. A violation of a commitment or contract
then justifies deprioritization regardless of relative prognosis com-
pared to others who fulfil their lifestyle contract. Opportunities for
asking patients to commit to lifestyle changes might arise, for ex-
ample, where smoking or overeating is compromising their health.
One of us (JS) has argued that there will be some ‘golden opportu-
nities’ for patients to make changes in a cost‐ and risk‐free way, such
as by switching from smoking tobacco to smoking electronic cigar-
ettes.45 Prioritization on the basis of a violation of a lifestyle contract
in these circumstances is therefore not subject to the same criticisms
that apply to policies that hold patients retrospectively responsible,
as at least the knowledge condition for responsibility will be more
clearly fulfilled, and the patient has made a positive commitment in
knowledge of the consequences of contractual violation. General
statement four—‘Lower priority should be allotted to patients who
violate a contract of changes in lifestyle’—taps into this sort of jus-
tification, as do the conditions for the allocation item ‘violation of
contract to changed lifestyle’.
Prognosis: The final potential justification for differential allocation is
not, in fact, sensitive to responsibility (strictly speaking,) but is nonetheless
sensitive to patients' behaviour, insofar as it affects their prognosis. Al-
location on the basis of prognosis essentially promotes efficient use of
healthcare resources in a system. Treatments will be withheld, or patients
deprioritized, in the event that their condition (and its expected trajectory,
given the patient's overall health) is unlikely to improve sufficiently with
treatment. Directing resources to the care that is expected to produce the
most benefit (and away from care that is expected to produce no or little
benefit) maximizes cost‐effectiveness. Allocation on the basis of prog-
nosis could justify policies such as withholding some surgeries from
smokers or obese individuals until or unless their behaviour changes to
improve their prognosis, regardless of whether they sign a lifestyle con-
tract. Items assessing support for elective surgery for smokers and obese
patients tap into the view that some treatment should be withheld unless
or until prognosis improves. It is important to note that deprioritization on
the basis of prognosis overlaps with (i.e. would often lead to the same
outcome as) deprioritization on the basis of a breach of lifestyle contract.
Two patients could sign a contract that requires them to stop smoking.
43See: Brown, R. C. (2013). Moral responsibility for (un) healthy behaviour. Journal of Medical
Ethics, 39(11), 695–698.
44See Brown, R. C., Maslen, H., & Savulescu, J. (2019). Against moral responsibilisation of
health: Prudential responsibility and health promotion. Public Health Ethics, 12(2), 114–129. 45Savulescu, op. cit. note 2.
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One patient may fulfil the contract, but have a very poor prognosis
(perhaps due to many extra years of smoking), whilst the other violates
the contract but has a much better prognosis. If fulfilment of lifestyle
contract were the primary rationing criterion the patient who fulfilled the
contract would be prioritized, if prognosis were the primary criterion it's
possible that the patient who continues to smoke would be prioritized,
due to much better health. Our vignettes were designed to vary re-
sponsibility and prognosis, to separate potential justifications.
4.1.1 | General responsibility statements
We asked Norwegian and UK doctors about the general relevance of
responsibility to healthcare. The first three items (see Table 1), although
not explicitly so described, tap into intuitions about holding people ret-
rospectively responsible, in line with the first justification. They differ in
the scarcity of the resource and therefore the extent to which they will
involve zero‐sum treatment situations (in which one patient's treatment
results in another's non‐treatment). Our data indicate that as the situation
gets close to zero‐sum (from general healthcare, through expensive
treatment, to scarce organs), doctors in both countries were more likely to
say that treatment should depend on the patient's personal responsibility.
The fourth item captured doctors' views on deprioritization as a
consequence of violating a lifestyle contract—a failure of prospective
responsibility. Although doctors in Norway were less inclined than
British doctors (perhaps as a consequence of UK doctors' greater
familiarity with such contractual agreements), more doctors in both
countries agreed that a patient's failure to fulfil a prospective re-
sponsibility should affect prioritization, than they did that healthcare
priority should depend on the patient's (retrospective) personal re-
sponsibility for the disease. This aligns with claims one of us has
defended regarding the greater permissibility of healthcare resource
allocation that is sensitive to failures of prospective responsibility
through violating lifestyle contracts, compared to policies that are
sensitive to (apparent) retrospective responsibility for ill health.46
The fifth item captured doctors' views on patients paying additional
co‐payments when they are responsible for their condition. More than
half of the doctors in both countries were opposed to this, with Nor-
wegian doctors even more likely to disagree than British doctors.
Doctors may have been alert to the potential unfairness that could
result from such a system: in such a system, those who are responsible
but rich could access treatment more easily than those who are re-
sponsible but poor, unless there were means‐tested payment exemp-
tions. Although also a topic of contention, cost‐internalization via high
taxation on unhealthy behaviour (e.g. higher taxes on cigarettes, alcohol
and sugary drinks) rather than treatment could be fairer.47 Proponents
of such a view might argue that access to healthcare is more funda-
mentally important than access to unhealthy behaviours, and therefore
that costs should attach to behaviour rather than treatments.
4.1.2 | Conditions for allocation
The second set of items asked doctors about their views regarding
which behaviours or factors should ‘influence allocation priorities in
healthcare, resulting in deprioritisation of patients' treatment where
present’. Here, respondents were given more detail about the parti-
cular circumstances in which patients' responsibility—or at least their
behaviour—might justify differential treatment. Responses to these
items can instructively be compared to responses to the first general
statement: in the present set of items, the precise basis on which a
patient might be considered responsible is identified.
It is therefore striking that responses to some of these items
demonstrated much greater agreement with deprioritization prac-
tices. In comparison, less than 40% agreed with the general state-
ment on responsibility and prioritization.
Although there were some differences between the United King-
dom and Norway in the ranking of which factors garnered the most
agreement, smoking, excessive alcohol consumption, and drug abuse all
generated more than 50% agreement in both countries. There are a
number of possible explanations for this finding. In order for an in-
dividual to be responsible for some outcome—in this case, ill health that
requires treatment—the individual's acts (or failures to act) must have
caused this outcome, and they must have had sufficient control over
their acts and sufficient knowledge of the consequences. It may be that
doctors perceive the causal link between ill health and each of smoking,
drug use and excessive alcohol consumption, respectively, to be more
certain (compared, e.g. to the causal link between ill health and lack of
exercise). Further, doctors may perceive that facts about the detrimental
effects of these behaviours are more widely and easily understood
within the general population, and that it is easier for patients to abstain
from these behaviours than it is to avoid poor quality nutrition, for
example, which could be seen as closely connected to poverty.
However, on the basis of this data, we cannot rule out that, rather
than having a justification on the basis of retrospective responsibility in
mind, doctors were considering the likely prognosis of patients who
engage in each behaviour. It could be that doctors believe that patients
who smoke, drink or take drugs will benefit less from the relevant
treatment than will individuals who do not exercise or have poor nu-
trition, for example. The former set of patients, but not the latter should,
if efficiency is to be maximized, be deprioritized relative to patients who
are expected to have better outcomes, if efficiency guides allocation.
Overall, it seems that when given more detail, doctors are more
likely to support differential allocation, whether this is on the basis of
retrospective responsibility or expected prognosis.
4.1.3 | Vignettes
In order to tease apart the potential justifications, which might draw
on either responsibility or prognosis (or both), we presented three
scenarios with different features, generating different combinations
of responsibility and prognosis (see Table 5). We note that all these
vignettes are zero‐sum scenarios. In line with the trends noted above,
46Ibid.
47For example, see: Véliz, C., Maslen, H., Essman, M., Taillie, L. S., & Savulescu, J. (2019).
Sugar, taxes, & choice. Hastings Center Report, 49(6), 22–31.
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the zero‐sum nature and increased detail of the scenario seem to
result in a perception of greater relevance of responsibility.
In Vignette 1—Cirrhosis—Patient A could be perceived to be re-
sponsible and have a good prognosis after treatment (since ongoing
sobriety is stipulated). Patient B is clearly not responsible, and po-
tentially also has a good prognosis after treatment.
InVignette 2—Injury—Patient A could be perceived to be responsible
and have poor ultimate prognosis48 (it is stipulated that they have re-
current self‐harm). Patient B is not responsible (it was an unlikely acci-
dent) and potentially has a better prognosis than patient A.
In Vignette 3—Emphysema—Patient A could be perceived to be
responsible. His prognosis to benefit from the transplant is uncertain
since he still smokes. He is otherwise in good health. Patient B is not
responsible, but could be expected to have poor prognosis (he is in
poor health).
Overall the patient who could be perceived to be not responsible
was preferred in every vignette. Since prognosis is potentially
equivalent for both patients in Vignette 1, the preference for treating
Patient B is likely to be a result of perceived responsibility only.
Doctors were most likely to prioritize the non‐responsible pa-
tient in the second vignette. This could represent the additive effect
of perceived poorer prognosis. (However, we did not ask doctors for
their reason for preferring Patient B. It is possible that clinicians had
other factors in mind—for example, they may have felt that the pa-
tient who had amputated their hand needed more urgent attention.
Alternatively, they may have had negative intuitions about the value
of saving the life of a patient who recurrently self‐harms).
In the final vignette, prognosis potentially conflicted with re-
sponsibility, since Patient B potentially would have a worse outcome
from the transplant. A larger proportion of respondents were inclined
to prioritize Patient A in this vignette. However, Patient B was still
preferred to Patient A, despite poorer prognosis.
These results show that as the items becamemore detailed regarding
the patients' responsibility for their condition, doctors in both countries
were more inclined to take responsibility into account. Indeed, in re-
sponse to the vignettes, in circumstances of allocating indivisible goods
(e.g. organs), the majority of doctors consistently allocated resources to
the individual who was perceived to be less responsible for their need for
resources. This was attenuated to some extent when prognosis was
better for the patient who was responsible, but prognosis did not out-
weigh responsibility in any of the scenarios.
4.1.4 | Locus of responsibility
When individuals have a moral responsibility to do or refrain from doing
something, this is almost always because their actions in this regard have
implications for others. In the case of a responsibility to maintain one's
health, we can ask which individual's, or which set of individuals', interests
are affected by one's health‐affecting behaviour, and so to whom one
‘owes’ it to maintain one's health. Our results show that a clear majority of
British doctors (90.89%) think that individuals have a responsibility—‘owe
it’—to themselves to look after their health. It is a contentious view in
ethics that there are moral duties that are purely self‐regarding. Rather
than doctors agreeing that one has a self‐regarding moral duty, it might
be that participants had something more akin to a ‘prudential responsi-
bility’ in mind.49 Although we aren't morally required to look after our
health for our own sake, we owe it to ourselves to do so in so far as it
promotes our well‐being (and in so far as we care about our well‐being).
However, even if there were to be a self‐regarding moral duty (and
especially if it is non‐moral in nature), it would not be in keeping with a
liberal state to ‘penalize’ individuals for failures in this regard.
A responsibility that is grounded in the duties we have to our
families may, however, be straightforwardly moral in nature, espe-
cially where we have dependants (82.71% British doctors agreed that
we owe it to our families to look after our health). When our lives are
closely intertwined with others, our health can affect our relation-
ships and our ability to fulfil our responsibilities to dependents. In so
far as we should try to avoid impairing our ability to nurture our
familial relationships and fulfil our familial obligations, we should at-
tempt to avoid states of ill health that are deleterious. There will be
disagreement about the strength and scope of such a duty, but even
TABLE 5 Responsibility and prognosis
across the vignettes Responsibility
Prognosis after
treatment
Vignette 1 (Cirrhosis) Patient A High Good (assuming sobriety)
Patient B Zero (no relevant behaviour;
genetic condition)
Good
Vignette 2 (Injury) Patient A High Poor (relapse likely)
Patient B Low (unlikely accident) Good
Vignette 3
(Emphysema)
Patient A High Unclear (good health but
still smokes)
Patient B Zero (no relevant behaviour;
genetic condition)
Poor (in poor health)
48It could also be that doctors thought that one is relatively unlikely to die from cutting one's
wrists.
49See: Brown et al., op. cit. note 44; Brown, R. C. H., Maslen, H., & Savulescu, J. (2019).
Responsibility, prudence and health promotion. Journal of Public Health, 41(3), 561–565.
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in this case, the plausibility of a state response via the mechanism of
deprioritized healthcare seems an overreach into the private sphere.
Finally, 69.16% of British doctors agreed that individuals owe it
to society to look after their health. This duty might be thought to be
grounded in solidarity arrangements, seen in healthcare systems in-
volving both rights and obligations.50 Since all are reliant on the
limited system, avoidably depleting the system violates obligations of
solidarity and therefore justifies penalty. The view that such a duty
exists would therefore provide a justification for some instances of
rationing. It would particularly support practices of cost‐sharing.
4.1.5 | OUS
British doctors who endorsed causing harm in order to bring about the
greater good were more likely to agree that access to expensive treat-
ment, and organ transplants should depend on the patient's personal
responsibility, and that patients who are responsible for a disease should
pay additional co‐payments. We interpret these results as indicating a
preference for the expected deterrent effect that such policies would
have, thus potentially increasing overall health and higher QALYs in the
population, rather than any theoretical alignment of endorsement of in-
strumental harm with endorsement of a responsibility‐sensitive criterion
of fairness/desert per se.
4.2 | Limitations
There are, as with any empirical project, key limitations that must be
considered. First, we had a low response rate from the British sample.
While the survey was sent to 8,500 potential respondents in the United
Kingdom, only 499 completed the survey, meaning it is difficult to gen-
eralize our conclusions to the population of British doctors as a whole. It
is possible that those doctors who self‐selected to respond to the in-
vitation to participate differ in some systematic way in their attitudes
about responsibility from those who did not. That noted, we share this
limitation with many previous studies, and the broadly similar pattern of
results across the British and Norwegian (where response rate was very
high) goes some way to alleviate this concern. Ultimately, we suggest that
imperfect data are better than no data at all.
Second, our results are only able to show doctors' self‐reported
attitudes, and we cannot speak to whether, and how much, doctors
might explicitly or implicitly use personal responsibility when refer-
ring patients for treatment in their own practices. Further work
should be done to examine the extent to which doctors act on their
views, potentially in contravention of official policy.
Third, there is always the chance in comparative studies that
translations can have subtly different meanings in different contexts.
Our vignettes, in particular, were taken from an existing Norwegian
project used in previous research51 and translated into English. It
remains possible that our translation changed the meaning in the UK
setting, and this could help explain some of the subtle country var-
iations. That said, it is important to note that the English translations
were vetted by one of the co‐authors (BB) who has used the Nor-
wegian versions in previous work, and that none of the vignettes
involved culturally‐specific conditions or backgrounds.
Finally, there is a need for further ethical analysis of potential policy
implications if doctors' views were in fact reflected in policy—for example
through the greater use of behavioural contracts in healthcare.
4.3 | Conclusion
To our knowledge, this is the first international comparison of physi-
cian attitudes to prioritization and responsibility in healthcare. We
found substantial overlap in the attitudes of British and Norwegian
doctors, though also some differences. A large proportion of doctors in
both countries supported including responsibility for illness in prior-
itization decisions. This finding was more prominent in zero‐sum sce-
narios, where allocation to one patient means that another patient is
denied treatment. Doctors were also more inclined to agree with
prioritization in more detailed and specific scenarios. There was most
support for incorporating prospective responsibility (through patient
contracts), and low support for integrating responsibility into co‐
payments (i.e. through requiring responsible patients to pay part of the
costs of treatment). Some behaviours were considered more appro-
priate grounds for deprioritization (smoking, alcohol, drug use)—
potentially because of the certainty of impact and direct link to ill
health. In zero‐sum situations, prognosis also influenced prioritization
(but did not outweigh responsibility).
Our findings are important. In two solidarity‐based healthcare sys-
tems, doctors are of the view that responsibility should be taken into
account, particularly for some behaviour‐illness combinations and where
resources are particularly limited. Particularly in Norway, these views di-
verge from official policy and guidance regarding responsibility‐sensitive
resource allocation. While healthcare professionals seem to take per-
ceived responsibility and perceived prognosis into account, they do not
seem to be informally adopting any specific account of responsibility or
prognosis when making their decisions. This highlights the need for more
clarity in official ethical guidance and policy. Whether or not doctors are
justified in making responsibility‐sensitive allocation decisions, and what
account of responsibility (if any) should be adopted is far more than a
theoretical question: decisions in such cases have repercussions for
people's lives. We have shown that responsibility‐like constructs are in
play in some aspects of decision‐making in both the United Kingdom and
Norway, despite differing (but somewhat vague) official positions. Pol-
icymakers must engage in ethical debate about how to more system-
atically structure, limit or encourage the decisional role that such factors
are playing.
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